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Politics and the Criminal Process:
Federal Public Corruption Prosecutions
of Popular Public Officials Under the
Honest Services Component of the Mail
and Wire Fraud Statutes
Thomas M. DiBiagio*
I. Introduction
Federal prosecutors have an established practice of
aggressively investigating and prosecuting state and local public
corruption.' To carry out these prosecutions, the government
primarily employs a component of the federal mail and wire fraud
statutes that make it a federal crime to defraud another of the
"intangible right to honest services."2 The right to honest services is
not defined in these statutes and is inherently ambiguous.
Nevertheless, the central proposition is that it is a federal criminal
offense for a state or local public official to defraud the public of
fair and honest government.
The intimidation and use of the criminal process as but another
political device is profoundly corrupting.3 With no established
* Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Maryland 1991-2000.
Partner, Dyer, Ellis & Joseph, Washington D.C.
1. See, e.g. David W. Chen, G.O.P. Official in Dutches County Pleads Guilty
in Federal Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2000, at A12 (describing
conviction of local public official based on extortion of payments from developers
in exchange for building permits and tax breaks).
2. 18 U.S.C. Section 1346.
3. See, e.g. David Johnston and Don Van Natta, Jr., Aides to Reno Strongly
Urged Inquiry on Gore, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 2000, at Al (describing the lengths
to which Justice Department officials went to protect Vice President Albert Gore
and other senior White House officials from an independent investigation into
their fund-raising activities in the 1996 presidential campaign); Rachel L. Swarns,
Prosecutor Resists Pataki Pressure on Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, March 21, 1996,
at B1 (describing Bronx District Attorney Robert T. Johnson's refusal to be
pressured by Governor George E. Pataki into seeking the death penalty in
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standards, a federal public corruption prosecution, based on the
intangible right to honest services, is particularly vulnerable to
being snarled by politics. It is here that politics has the potential to
produce one of the most disabling impacts on public confidence in
the underlying fairness, integrity and public reputation of the
criminal process. Drawing on a fictional account of a corrupt
relationship between a popular state senator and a managed care
corporation, this article will demonstrate that public corruption
prosecutions based on the "honest services" doctrine are
particularly vulnerable to being interducted by political device.
This article will then suggest the character and the legal rationale
necessary to navigate a public corruption prosecution away from
the intimidating and disabling impact of these political devices.
II. The Pattern of Corruption: "Money In and Favors Out"
An investigative report in the newspaper revealed that over
the last year a state senator and chairman of the health care
committee in the state's general assembly received a series of
payments from a managed health care corporation. The report
detailed that during his last campaign, the senator accepted $20,000
in campaign contributions from the corporation. In addition, when
the general assembly was not in session, the senator worked at a
real estate firm where he was a part owner. The report detailed
that the senator earned $10,000 in commissions from the same
health care corporation in connection with the purchase of office
space in the senator's district.
Although the payments themselves were not illegal, the report
further detailed that during the period of time that the campaign
contributions were made and the real estate commissions paid, the
senator helped navigate the corporation through the state's health
care bureaucracy, influenced legislation that benefited the corpora-
tion and assisted the corporation in securing a state license to
operate a health maintenance organization in the state. In addition,
the senator played an active role in assisting the corporation secure
a lucrative contract to manage the state's Medicaid program. An
accelerating chain of articles prompts a federal investigation.
The federal investigation that followed uncovered additional
facts. The campaign contributions and the real estate commissions
were disclosed in the required financial disclosure forms. However,
the federal investigation uncovered a third payment. Two months
connection with prosecution of a person accused of killing a New York City police
officer).
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after the Medicaid contract was awarded, the corporation gave
$10,000 to a charity actively promoted by the state senator. Federal
investigators were unable to determine whether the charity was
used as a conduit for a direct payment to the senator. These
additional facts were all subsequently reported in the newspaper.
In response, the state senator made numerous public
appearances in an attempt to explain his conduct. Although
appearing decidedly uncomfortable, the senator claimed that his
intervention on behalf of the managed care corporation was in
accordance with his conscience and the public's interest. He
emphasized that the public has benefited from the state contract
because the administration of the Medicaid program has improved.
He, however, made a vague apology for "acts that were inappro-
priate" and for any "lapses in judgment."
The state senator used his persuasive charm effectively and
was extremely effective at courting popular approval. Public
opinion polls conducted after the newspaper reports and the
initiation of the federal investigation reflected a favorable opinion
of him. Although no polls were conducted to determine whether
the public understood the legal issues involved in the contemplated
prosecution, polls indicated that the senator should receive a formal
censure or reprimand, but not be prosecuted. This appeared to
reflect, in part, a strong economy in the senator's district, the
public's preoccupation economy and not the state senator's
conduct. Seven months later, the public continued to be
unwavering in support. It dismissed the conduct and reelected the
state senator with sixty-four percent of the vote.4
The public was indifferent to the state senator's conduct and
wanted him to remain in office. It signaled its aversion to the
investigation, first in the polls and then, more forcefully, in the
election. The United States Attorney, contemplating a run for state
attorney general, has her personal approval ratings stuck in the
single digits for the past six months, in part, as a reflection of the
public's weariness with the investigation. In addition, a battery of
community leaders publicly criticized her for pursuing the
investigation. The United States Attorney was increasingly
4. This scenario actually happened in Miami in 1998. See Carl Hiaasen,
"Indictments Don't Faze Voters," MIAMI HERALD Nov. 5, 1998, at 1B (describing
the relection of a state sentor despite pending federal indictment for Medicare
fraud. The public official was subsequently convicted). See David Kidwell,




frustrated at her inability to use her public position to enhance her
own image and increase her favorable exposure to voters.
The senator's ability to maintain crucial public support
throughout the unseemly crisis baffled federal prosecutors. The
prosecutors believed that the evidence shows that the senator was
paid to influence the awarding of the state's Medicaid contract.
Nevertheless, they are reluctant to go forward. They are con-
fronted with a vexing quandary and the question of whether the
state senator's favorable public opinion polls, his reelection or the
public benefit of the underlying state Medicaid contract preclude a
subsequent prosecution under the honest services component of the
mail and wire fraud statute.
III. Federal Prosecution of State and Local Public Corruption
A. Federal Intervention Into State and Local Public Corruption
Federal prosecutors have a legitimate role in holding state and
local public officials accountable for abuse of power and influence.
Beyond the need to further public confidence in the underlying
institutional integrity of the political process, there are several
practical reasons that support federal investigation and prosecution
of state and local corruption. First, public corruption investigations
and prosecutions are often hindered by a protocol of silence.
Rarely does a knowledgeable insider break with the public official
and support the charges against him. These individuals typically
share lockers and life styles. As a consequence, there is nothing
more effective at addressing public corruption and motivating
cooper-ation from knowledgeable insiders than a credible federal
investigation and prosecution Second, the resources available to
support a federal investigation and prosecution of local corruption
far exceed the resources typically available to state and local law
enforcement officials. Third, state prosecutors are elected officials.
As a result, state prosecutors and the targets of a public corruption
probe typically are the product of the same political network. This
proximately may make it difficult for a state prosecutor to
5. See, e.g., Alan Fuer, Three Are Guilty Of Cover-Up Plot In Louima
Attack," N.Y. TIMES, March 7, 2000, at Al (describing conviction of three New
York City police officers for covering up the assault of individual while in police
custody); David Barstow, "Police Wall of Silence Shows Some Cracks in Torture
Case," N.Y. TIMES May 21, 1999, at Al (describing that credible and intensive
federal investigation was effective at obtaining cooperation from police officers in
prosecution of police misconduct case.).
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objectively recognize local public corruption and move aggressively
to address it. Fourth, the jury pool that will ultimately pass
judgment on the conduct will be drawn from individuals outside
local political precincts. Fifth, at trial, state law may impose
particularly difficult evidentiary burdens on public corruption
prosecutions. For example, state law may preclude the prosecution
from introducing evidence of the defendant's legislative acts in a
public corruption prosecution. In contrast, in a federal prosecution
of a state legislator, the government is not precluded from intro-
ducing evidence of the defendant's legislative acts.6 Finally, federal
sentences typically exceed the penalties under state public
corruption statutes. All of these factors weigh strongly in favor of
federal intervention into state and local public corruption.
B. The Intangible Right to Fair and Honest Government
There are three primary federal statutes employed by federal
prosecutors against state and local corruption. First, section 666
extends federal bribery prohibitions to state and local officials
employed by agencies receiving federal funds.7 Second, section
6. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980). In addition, state law
may require that prosecutors supplement accomplice testimony with a substantial
amount of corroborating evidence. See Collins v. State, 568 A.2d 1 (1990)
(conviction may not rest upon uncorroborated testimony of accomplice). These
evidentiary rules have the potential of unnecessarily terminating a public
corruption prosecution. See, e.g., Walter F. Roche, Baltimore liquor case sees
quick end, Judge throws out bribe charge; 2 plead guilty to conspiracy, BALT. Sun,
Jan. 20, 1999 at Al (discussing the dismissal of state bribery charges on ground
that accomplice testimony not sufficiently corroborated).
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000). Section 666 contains three interrelated
elements. First, the statute applies only if a state or local government or agency
receives in excess of $10,000 in federal assistance in any one-year period. See 18
U.S.C. Section 666(b). Second, a defendant must pay, solicit or accept something
of value from another person. Third, this thing of value must be connected to a
transaction of $5,000 or more. Id. at 666 (a). See United States v. Santopietro, 166
F.3d 88 (2nd Cir. 1999) (reinstating bribery conviction of several local public
officials based on use of their political position to influence decisions by various
city agencies in return for bank loans and cash payments and rejecting contention
that the corrupt transaction must be worth $5,000 or more to the entity receiving
federal funds). The statute does not require that the government must prove that
federal funds actually were involved in or affected by the bribery transaction. See
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 118 S. Ct. 469 (1997). The federal courts of
appeals are divided as to whether the government must show a relationship
between the bribe and the federal program or funds. See Fischer, 168 F.3d at 1277-
78 (holding that government is not required to show a relationship between the
bribe and the federal program or funds); United States v. Dakota, 188 F.3d 663,
668 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Zack, F.3d (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the
government is required to show a relationship between the bribe and the federal
program or funds).
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1952, commonly known as the Travel Act, prohibits the use of the
mails or any facility in interstate commerce with the intent to
further an unlawful activity.8  Third, sections 1341 and 1343,
commonly known as the mail and wire fraud statutes, make it a
federal crime to use the mails or interstate wires in connection with
a scheme to defraud.9 As typically employed, the term "scheme to
defraud" means a misrepresentation or concealment of a material
fact." In 1988, Congress enacted a public corruption component to
the mail and wire fraud statutes. Section 1346 places public
corruption within the purview of the mail and wire fraud statutes by
defining a "scheme to defraud" to include defrauding another of
the "intangible right to honest services."11  A federal fraud
prosecution under Section 1346 requires that the government prove
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000). The elements of a Section 1952 offense are as
follows: (1) travel or use of the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign
commerce; (2) with the specific intent to promote, manage, establish, or carry on
or distribute the proceeds of unlawful activity; and (3) knowing and willful
commission of an act in furtherance of that intent subsequent to the act of travel or
use of the mail or facility of interstate or foreign commerce. An "unlawful
activity" includes extortion and bribery under the applicable state law. See United
States v. Bankston, 182 F.3d 296, 315 (5th Cir. 1999) (upholding Travel Act
conviction of state legislator).
9. See 18 U.S.C § 1341 (2000) (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000) (wire
fraud). Although the mail and wire fraud statutes contain different jurisdictional
elements, they both prohibit, in pertinent part, "any scheme or artifice to defraud"
or obtain money or property "by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations or promises." Id. See e.g. United States v. O'Hagan, 139 F.3d 641,
651-52 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming mail fraud conviction of attorney who used
confidential business information to purchase securities).
10. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1346. See United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 803 (9th Cir.
1999) (Congress intended Section 1346 to reach schemes that seek to deprive the
people of a state of the intangible right to honest services); United States v.
Waymer, 55 F.3d 564, 569 (11th Cir. 1995) ("Section 1346 effectuates the legitimate
governmental aim of punishing those who use the mails to carry out fraudulent
schemes to deprive others of their intangible rights to honest services."); United
States v. Silvano, 812 F.2d 754, 758 (1st Cir. 1987) (same). Section 1346 was
enacted in direct response to the Supreme Court's decision in McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987) in which the Court held that the federal mail
and wire fraud statutes did not apply to schemes to defraud another of the
intangible right of honest services. In introducing Section 1346 as part of the Anti-
Corruption Act of 1988, Senator Joseph Biden stated:
I am pleased today to join with my colleagues in introducing the Anti-
Corruption Act of 1988 ... This bill will make it possible, once again, to
prosecute and send to prison those public officials who corrupt their
offices and betray the trust placed in them. It reverses the McNally case
by creating a new public corruption statute that will be used to bring
charges against anyone who attempts to deprive the citizens of the United
States or of any State of the honest services of a public official ...
134 CONG. REC. S12582-04 (Sept. 7, 1988) (Statement of Sen. Biden).
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three elements: first, that the defendant knowingly and willfully
participated in a scheme to defraud; second, that the defendant
intended to defraud the victim of fair and honest government; third,
that the defendant used the mails or interstate wire communi-
cations in furtherance of the scheme.12
There are few areas of federal criminal law as ambiguous as
the criteria for prosecution under Section 1346. The term
"intangible right to honest services" is not defined in the statute
and is inherently imprecise. This has created a profound flaw in the
law. As a consequence, the statute is typically nuanced and
fashioned by the prosecutor and the arguments over the scope of
Section 1346 turn less on interpretation than on facts. As such with
no established standards, favorable public opinion polls or the
reelection of the public official may be seen as expressing a popular
sentiment in conflict with an indictment under the honest services
statute.
IV. Prosecutorial Character
A. The Decision to Initiate an Investigation and Prosecution.
Prosecutors are not part of a non-partisan priesthood purified
of all base motives. Many are political actors who are more
attentive to their own interests than those of the institutions they
serve. As a consequence, many prosecutors expose themselves to
challenges that the exercise of their professional discretion is often
in furtherance of their personal aspirations and ambitions. These
prosecutors fail to understand that a prosecutor's credibility arises
by virtue of his fidelity to high ethical standards." Those
prosecutors who share this core value and commitment also share a
deep appreciation that the decision to launch a criminal
investigation represents an awesome use of government authority,
requiring mature and detached judgments that should not be
obscured by personal ambition.'
12. See Frega, 179 F.3d at 802-803 (affirming federal public corruption
conviction of state court judges under Section 1346); see also United States v.
Paradise, 98 F.3d 1266, 1283 n.30 (11th Cir. 1996) (collecting cases applying Section
1346).
13. Maintaining high standards is not as simple as it seems. First, society tends
to be allergic to demanding values or respecting them in others. Moreover,
adhering to high standards as a federal prosecutor is made more difficult if political
considerations cause priorities to be constantly constructed and reconstructed.
14. Over the last seven years, the criminal process has been injected into
popular culture through intensive reporting on several investigations and
2000]
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The decision that certain conduct merits a thorough inquiry
and criminal investigation can potentially destroy a person's life
and reputation. The personal and financial strain of such an inquiry
are considerable.15 These consequences are more severe for a
public official who is subject to a federal public corruption
investigation. The stain of a corruption invest-igation may be
indelible. Consequently, the quality of justice suffers from
prosecutors who fail to appreciate the consequences of their
conduct. The public is best served by investigations conducted in a
timely and professional manner and decisions to prosecute arising
from an honest judgment of the law and quality of the evidence.
B. Elections and Favorable Public Opinion Polls
To establish a federal mail or wire fraud offense under section
1346, the government must show that the defendant intended to
defraud or deny the public of its right to fair and honest
government. For example, relying on the self-confidence of his
reelection and high job approval ratings, the senator described
herein may argue that these affirmative public statements are hard
evidence that the "victim" (ie. the public) has not been denied fair
and honest government. He may argue that these public statements
effectively preclude a federal fraud prosecution under the
intangible right to honest services doctrine. However, neither
reelection nor favorable public opinion polls disable a subsequent
prosecution under Section 1346.
prosecutions. For most people, their education about criminal law began with a
white Ford Bronco and ended with a blue Gap dress. However, one of the most
remarkable results of this frenzy has been to purvey a distorted caricature of
prosecutors that bears little resemblance to the individuals who actually do this
work.
Prosecutors make mistakes. Their job necessarily involves the daily exercise
of discretion and judgment. Not ever decision is the correct one. Sometimes these
mistakes lead to an acquittal. Most of the time, mistakes lead to personal and
professional embarrassment.
15. A prosecutor has a duty to the public to pursue every avenue of inquiry in
an organized and decisive manner. Events must be objectively explored and
completely explained. But, respect for the rule of law does not require a
suspension of reasonable prosecutorial discretion. Every case is not the Oklahoma
City bombing. The public interest is not served by a holy war. The problem with a
holy war is that any chance for a conviction is often impaled by the resulting
emotional distraction. The prosecution becomes personal. In the resulting
intensity, the prosecutor losses touch with common sense and he tends to act
irresponsible. He often appears vindictive, mean spirited and excessive. As a
consequence, his acts often serve only to wreck his credibility.
[Vol. 105:1
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Public opinion polls and elections may express a popular
sentiment in conflict with an investigation and prosecution.
Nevertheless, these political statements do not necessarily collapse
into the criminal process to trump the legal imperatives. Unlike the
political process, accountability and punishment are fundamental to
the criminal process. The adjudication of a federal public
corruption offense is not a political matter. It should not be
decided on the terrain of public opinion.
There is a clear demarcation between the political and criminal
processes. The political process is not a fact-finding process
involving the receipt and examination of evidence. The political
process does not specify any standard of proof, nor incorporate
rules of procedure or rules of evidence to ensure that judgments are
consistent and based on known standards and reliable and credible
facts rather than innuendo and speculation. 6 As a consequence,
political statements are collateral to judgments assigned to the
criminal process, and prosecutors should display the character
necessary to preclude politics from dominating their most sensitive
decisions and obligations.
Inverting the standards and considering political devices in the
criminal process has a reciprocal peril. If one takes into account
popular public opinion polls in making a pursue to decline a
prosecution, one must then accept the corresponding levels of
public emotion and the reputation of the individual in making a
decision to proceed with a prosecution. The decision to investigate
and prosecute may be viewed as a reflective response to mob
sentiment and public calls for vengeance. The indictment of an
unpopular defendant, therefore, would be subject only to an
expedient deliberative process and not a dispassionate assessment
of the evidence. In such a situation the corruption and
complacency of prosecutors in considering political statements are
the most striking. 7
16. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974):
But this presumptive privilege [Presidential communications] must be
considered in light of our historic commitment to the rule of law. This is
nowhere more profoundly manifest than in our view that the twofold aim
of criminal justice is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. We
have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which
the parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to develop
all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and
comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if
judgments were founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the
facts.
17. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Salinas Case: New Attitude or Old Mexican
20001
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It may be argued that a prosecutor who seeks an indictment
and pursues a prosecution after reelection or favorable public
opinion polls improperly frustrates the community's sense of
justice. The variance with public sentiment is not grounded upon
the paternalistic notion that, in his insularity, a prosecutor
understands more fully than the public what is good for them. On
the contrary, favorable public opinion polls or reelections neither
mitigate nor alter the underlying facts indicating that an individual
has committed a federal criminal offense. A prosecutor's duty is to
make reflective and independent judgments that conform with the
evidence rather than basing them upon popular opinion.
A prosecutor is under no obligation to accept popular
sentiment or any statement by the electorate of its sense of justice. 8
These statements simply imply an indifference to or different view
of the underlying conduct. Thus, favorable public opinion polls and
reelection do not eclipse a prosecutor's obligation to see that the
laws are faithfully executed. These public statements do not
provide a sustained rationale that vitiates a prosecutor's duty to
render judgment according to the applicable law and assessment of
the evidence. This commitment is compelled whether or not the
inquiry is popular or unpopular. Otherwise, we would be left with a
professional class that is incapable of rising to a high level of
professionalism and respect for the law.
To consider reelection and public opinion polls as a factor in a
charging decision would have serious and prolonged consequences
on the criminal process. It would demonstrate a fecklessness
inappropriate to the responsibilities of a prosecutor. It would signal
the acceptance of a false equation between the political and
Politics?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 23, 1999, at A3 (describing the belief that because
prosecution's case was "weak and tainted," conviction of brother of former
president was politically induced; the conviction "left many Mexicans suspecting
that it was politically inspired. And, thus, it did not ultimately break with the
debilitating tradition of bending the judicial system to shifting political
purposes."); Seth Faison, China Points Finger at Culprit of the Week, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 1999, at A8:
[In China] corruption cases are generally prosecuted for political, rather
than legal, imperatives. As most Chinese officials know, the most useful
rule of thumb in determining who is prosecuted for corruption is looking
at who lacks connections.
Corruption exists throughout the vast bureaucracy and in state-owned
companies. When prosecutors are looking for someone to be used as an
example they invariably settle on those whose connections are weak and
then find evidence as needed.
18. However, with the chronic low voter turnout that characterizes American
elections, there is a compelling argument that popular sentiment cannot be
inferred from an election result.
[Vol. 105:1
POLITICS AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
criminal process and legitimate role for political polls, approval
ratings and periodic elections in the criminal process. The next step
would be for prosecutors to rely on image-makers and focus groups
to see what kind of crimes and criminals the public wants
prosecuted. The result would be, a culture of corruption and
complacency and a criminal process, once conceived as a matter of
paramount seriousness, will become just another trivial precinct of
raw and partisan politics in service of the vagaries of public
sentiment.
The investigation and prosecution of public corruption rarely
meshes smoothly with political realities. However, the principles
involved are too vital to sacrifice for political convenience. The
essential question is whether the prosecution has the character,
commitment and courage to prosecute a popular public official in
the manner prescribed, or is content to allow the public to be the
victim of a manipulative and corrupt process.19 Certainly, the
prosecution of a popular public official imposes numerous practical
difficulties. ° Nevertheless, a fundamental part of the prosecutor's
job is being tenacious, fair and accurate whatever the constraints
19. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,421 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring):
The case before us illustrates better than most that the judicial power is
often difficult in its exercise. We cannot here ask another Branch to
share responsibility, as when the argument is made that a statute is flawed
or incomplete. For we are presented with clear and simple statute to be
judged against a pure command of the Constitution. The outcome can be
laid at no door but ours.
The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not
like. We make them because they are right, right in the sense that the law
and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result. And so great is
our commitment to the process that, except in the rare case, we do not
pause to express distaste for the result, perhaps for fear of undermining a
valued principle that dictates the decision.
20. It is a reality that political influences cannot not be completely removed
from public corruption prosecutions. The decision to investigate and prosecute a
popular public official will be influenced and affected by political considerations.
The direction and intensity of the investigation will be controlled by a political
appointee, the United States Attorney. He alone will make the decision whether
to dedicate the resources to the investigation. Regrettably, it is here that political
and legal considerations may become inextricably intertwined to disable the
prosecution. The commitment to and focus of the investigation will reflect his
commitment to the matter. A prosecution of a popular public official may not fit
his personal ambition or political aspirations. If the United States Attorney is
politically compliant and not committed to an intense effort to expose misconduct,
the investigation will not be given the priority or prosecutorial mandate it
deserves. As a result, the matter will be consumed by the tedious and tawdry
details of political manipulation and the investigation and prosecution will never
result in a credible accounting of the conduct the public deserves.
2000]
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and distractions.21 Proving that the facts are in harmony with the
allegations is the surest way to both serve the public and vindicate
the merits of the investigation and prosecution.
The consequences of accepting a target's reelection or
favorable public opinion polls as an arresting event would
undermine public confidence in the integrity of the criminal
process. Moreover, the reason to pursue an indictment and
prosecution of a corrupt official is bolstered rather than derailed by
his reelection. Reelection may simply be the product of institutional
corruption. As a consequence, aborting an indictment and
prosecution of a corrupt politician due to his reelection simply
fosters a culture of impunity.
2
C. Actual Harm Is Not an Element of the Offense in a Federal
Fraud Prosecution Under Section 1346.
1. Section 1346 Does Not Address the Wisdom or Results of a
Public Official's Corrupt Conduct.-A public official may argue
that the merit or benefit of the underlying state action indicates an
absence of an intent to defraud the victim.' For example, the state
21. One of the most harmful distractions to a public corruption prosecution is
the media. Rather than embracing what the media can do for them, prosecutors
should consider what it could do to them. The prosecutor may display a lack of
self-awareness and enjoy the recognition of seeing his name in the morning
newspaper and his courtroom caricature accompany the television evening news
reports. However, prosecutors may eventually become crestfallen when they end
up smothered by the fanfare. First, this attention will draw numerous intervening
ambitions to the case that tend to disrupt any consistency in the investigation and
coherence in the presentation at trial. Second, after exposing the conduct, the
press coverage may inadvertently encourage public sentiment against the
prosecution. Typically, daily press coverage of a trial is a distortion because the
news reports tend to magnify a dramatic moment while largely ignoring the
substance of the case. The prosecutors should be prepared for these distractions,
carry the burden of responsibility and have the courage to persist.
22. The rationale underlying the argument that reelection and favorable public
opinion polls preclude prosecution yields to prosecution in more compelling
circumstances. A state acquittal does not preclude a subsequent federal
prosecution. Under the dual sovereign doctrine, the double jeopardy protection
does not bar a defendant's trial and conviction after the state prosecution results in
an acquittal. See United States v. Trammell, 133 F.3d 1343, 1349-51 (10th Cir.
1998) (permitting federal prosecution after acquittal in state court); United States
v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1439 (9th Cir. 1994) (same) affd in part and rev'd in part on
other grounds, Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). If a jury verdict of not
guilty does preclude subsequent prosecution, certainly elections and opinion polls
do not.
23. For example, recently it has been revealed that the selection of Salt Lake
City for the 2002 Winter Olympics involved improper payments to delegates of the
Olympic committee responsible for the decision. See Jere Longman & Jo Thomas,
Report Details Lavish Spending In Salt Lake's Bid to Win Games, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
POLITICS AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
senator described herein may assert that the public is actually
benefiting from the current administration of the state's Medicaid
program. Nevertheless, any collateral merit or benefit of the
underlying state action is not a defense to a federal fraud
prosecution under the intangible right to honest services.2' That the
result of the scheme actually benefits the public does not mitigate
the character of the fraud. Section 1346 does not address the
wisdom or results of a public official's corrupt conduct; rather, it
concerns the manner in which officials make their decision.
In prosecutions based on private conduct, several courts
require the government to show "contemplated harm, 25 or an
"identifiable economic risk., 26 Requiring evidence of contemplated
harm means that the prosecution must show that actual harm or
injury was contemplated or reasonably foreseeable.27 Contrary to
10, 1999, at Al. Those accused of tendering the improper benefits may assert that
their actions resulted in no direct personal benefit and were taken solely to benefit
Salt Lake City.
24. See United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1075 (1st Cir. 1997); United
States v. D'Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1994).
25. When dealing with commercial transactions in the private sector, the
courts have held that a mere breach of fiduciary duty may not be sufficient to
deprive the business or corporation of "honest services" under section 1346.
Accordingly, to sustain a mail fraud conviction under section 1346 in the business
context, the government must prove that a defendant caused or intended to cause
actual harm or injury. This means that the government must show financial or
economic harm. See United States v. Pennington, 168 F.3d 1060, 1065 (8th Cir.
1999); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Cochran, 109 F.3d 660, 668 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Stouffer, 986 F.2d
916, 922 (5th Cir. 1993). The leading case cited in support of this proposition is the
Second Circuit's decision in D'Amato. In that case, the court held that:
The scheme to defraud need not have been successful or complete.
Therefore, the victims of the scheme need not have been injured.
However, the government must show that some actual harm or injury was
contemplated by the schemer. Because the defendant must intend to
harm the fraud's victim, misrepresentations amounting only to deceit are
insufficient to maintain a mail or wire fraud prosecution. Instead, the
deceit must be coupled with a contemplated harm to the victim. In many
cases, this requirement poses no additional obstacle for the government.
When the necessary result of the actor's scheme is to injure others,
fraudulent intent may be inferred from the scheme itself. Where the
scheme does not cause injury to the alleged victims as its necessary result,
the government must produce evidence independent of the alleged
scheme to show the defendant's fraudulent intent.
39 F.3d at 1257 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
26. See Frost, 125 F.3d at 369.
27. In Frost, the court explained why proof of contemplated harm in private
fraud cases is appropriate:
The prosecution must prove that the employee intended to breach a
fiduciary duty, and that the employee foresaw or reasonably should have
forseen that his employer might suffer an economic harm as a result of
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this proposition, several circuits have held that prosecution is not
required to prove contemplated harm in private fraud prosecutions.
In United States v. Bereano,28 the defendant, a registered lobbyist in
Maryland, was charged with mail fraud under section 1346. At trial,
the government showed that the defendant had over-billed a total
of $600 for "legislative entertainment" when those bills were
actually reimbursements for unauthorized cam-paign contributions.
At trial, these clients testified that, regardless of the mischaracter-
ization of the payments, they were satisfied with the defendant's
services. The defendant was convicted.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the evidence was legally
insufficient to support a mail fraud conviction under section 1346
because the government failed to show some type of contemplated
harm. Relying on statements of the victims that they were satisfied
with the defendant's services, the defendant asserted that no
contemplated harm was present. The Fourth Circuit rejected this
argument and held that evidence of contemplated harm is not an
element of the offense.29 The court then specifically rejected the
proposed relevancy of the statements of the victims:
Such issues are not decided at the whim of the perceived victim.
The perception of the victim or target of the scheme is
ultimately irrelevant to whether [the defendant] devised a
scheme, or acted with the requisite intent to defraud. If a
scheme to defraud has been or is intended to be devised, it
makes no difference whether the persons the schemers intended
to defraud are gullible or skeptical, dull or bright. These are
the breach .... Proof that the employer simply suffered only the loss of
the loyalty and fidelity of the defendant is insufficient to convict. We
recognize that the literal terms of the "intangible right to honest services"
doctrine do not indicate that the prosecution must prove that a fiduciary
breach has created a risk of economic harm to the employer. Rather, the
literal terms suggest that dishonesty by an employee, standing alone is a
crime. Courts, however, have refused to interpret the doctrine so
broadly .... This refusal to carry the intangible rights doctrine to its
logical extreme stems from a need to avoid the over-criminalization of
private relationships.
Id. at 369; see also United States v. Walker, 191 F.3d 326, 335 (2d Cir. 1999)
(holding that evidence of contemplated actual harm or injury to the victims in mail
fraud prosecution means proof of a discrepancy between benefits reasonably
anticipated because of the misleading representations and the actual benefits
which the defendant delivered or intended to deliver).
28. 1998 WL 553445 (4th Cir.) cert. denied 119 S. Ct.(1999).
29. See id.
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criminal statutes, not tort concepts. The only issue is whether
there is a plan, scheme or artifice intended to defraud.30
Consistent with this proposition, the Eleventh and Sixth
Circuits have rejected the argument that actual harm is an element
of a public corruption offense. In United States v. Mack," the
defendant, a security guard at an Ohio state prison, was convicted
of mail fraud under Section 1346 for receiving an airline ticket and
a bottle of scotch from a prison inmate in exchange for preferential
treatment and special favors. On appeal, the defendant argued
that his conviction should be reversed because the government
failed to prove that his conduct caused actual harm to either the
prison facility or the citizens of Ohio.33  The Sixth Circuit
distinguished between private and public frauds and held that in
public frauds, the government was not required to prove actual
harm.3 4
In United States v. Lopez-Lukis,35 the defendant, a member of a
local county commission in Florida, was charged with mail fraud
under Section 1346. The government alleged that the defendant
attempted to control the composition of the commission in order to
steer construction and underwriting contracts to clients of her
husband's lobbying firm.36 The district court suppressed evidence
relating to the attempt to control the votes of other members of the
commission and the government appealed. On appeal, the
defend-ant countered the government's assertion that the evidence
was relevant by contending that the act of attempting to control a
majority of votes did not constitute a scheme to defraud the citizens
30. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (finding that a specific
intent to defraud could be properly inferred from the underlying conduct because
the political contributions were not authorized by the victims). cf United States v.
Shields, 999 F.2d 1090, 1096 (7th Cir. 1993) (rejecting argument that prosecution is
required to prove actual prejudice in bribery prosecution of state trial judge);
United States v. Ferrara, 990 F. Supp. 146, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (rejecting
defendant's argument that government was required to prove adverse financial
impact to government in section 666 prosecution); accord United States v.
Desantis, 134 F.3d 760, 764 (6th Cir. 1998) (defendant's belief that no investor
would suffer a loss from fraud not a defense to securities or mail fraud
prosecution).
31. 159 F.3d 208 (6th Cir. 1998).
32. See id. at 214.
33. See-id. at 215-16.
34. See id. at 216.
35. 102 F.3d 1164 (11th Cir. 1997).
36. See id. at 1165.
37. See id. at 1167.
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of the intangible right to honest services." The Eleventh Circuit
rejected this argument and held that attempts to control or
controlling a majority of legislative votes for a price constitute a
scheme to defraud under section 1346.3' The court underscored
that actual harm is not necessary to sustain a mail fraud conviction
under section 1346:
The crux of the theory of honest services is that when a political
official uses his office for personal gain, he deprives his
constituents of their right to have him perform his official duties
in their best interest .... When a government officer decides
how to proceed in an official endeavor-as when a legislator
decides how to vote on an issue-his constituents have a right to
have their best interests form the basis of that decision. If the
official instead secretly makes his decision based on his own
personal interests-as when an official accepts a bribe or
personally benefits from an undisclosed conflict of interest-the
official has defrauded the public of his honest services... That
the result of the bribed commissioner's vote actually benefits the
electorate would not change the fraudulent nature of her conduct.
Sections 1341 and 1346 do not address the wisdom or results of a
legislative decision; rather, they concern the manner in which
officials make their decisions.40
2. Evidence of Legislative Acts.-An evidentiary issue
intertwined with the issue of the merit of the underlying conduct is
the admissibility of evidence of legislative acts. In the state
prosecution of a state legislator and federal prosecution of a federal
legislator, the government is precluded from introducing any
evidence related to the legislator's legislative actions to show
motive-that such behavior was in furtherance of a bribe.'
38. See id. at 1165.
39. See id. at 1169-70.
40. Lopez v. Lukis, 102 F.3d at 1169 (emphasis added) (partial text of footnote
13 included); see also United States v. Blumeyer, 114 F.3d 758 (8th Cir. 1997)
(upholding conviction based on attempts by defendants to appropriate state
legislator's discretion for the defendant's benefit; the fact that many of the
legislator's efforts were not enacted into law was held irrelevant because "the
public's right to the honest services of a public officer is violated when the officer
uses a public position to pursue dishonest ends, not merely when the officer
achieves a dishonest goal."); see also United States v. Rowe, 56 F.2d 747, 749 (2d
Cir.) (L. Hand, J.) (damages is not an element of offense of mail fraud) cert. denied
286 U.S. 554, 52 S. Ct. 579 (1932).
41. See United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 485-89 (1979) (barring
admission of evidence of actual performance of legislative acts in public corruption
prosecution under Speech and Debate Clause); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S.
501, 527 (1972) (same); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d
408, 415 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same). In his dissent in Helstoski, Justice Stevens
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However, if the legislator expresses an unequivocal waiver 42 for the
purpose of asserting as an affirmative defense, the government is
then free to cross-examine the defendant about his legislative acts
and introduce legislative acts in a rebuttal case. As the Third
Circuit acknowledged in United States v. McDade," a public official
may find it "tactically advantageous" to offer such evidence when
he is charged with influencing or affecting public action to rebut
any assertion that his conduct was intended to further a private
interest.' A public official is, therefore, free to introduce evidence
of his legislative acts to rebut any assertion that he was motivated
by a corrupt intent-and to show that there was no link between
any payment and his actions to influence or affect public action. In
response, the government may introduce evidence regarding the
decision-making process and that the public official knew or should
have known that the contemplated public action was ill-conceived.
In contrast, in the federal prosecution of a state legislator, the
government is not precluded from introducing evidence of the
defendant's legislative acts. In United States v., Gillock,4 the
Supreme Court rejected a claim that a speech and debate privilege
prevents the government from using evidence of a state legislators'
legislative acts in a federal prosecution. In Gillock, a Tennessee
state senator agreed to introduce state legislation which would
enable four persons to obtain masters electricians' licenses which
they had been unable to gain through existing examination
processes.' The defendant was indicted by the federal grand jury
wrote that evidence of a defendant's legislative acts would be probative of a
defendant's intent in accepting a payment and thus, would be an "important" and
"legitimate" part of the government's case:
As a practical matter... it is clear that evidence relating to a legislator's
motivation for accepting a bribe will also be probative of his intent in
committing the official act for which the bribe was solicited or paid...
[I]nquiries into his motivation in accepting a bribe... obviously may be
revealing as to both the existence of legislative acts and the motivation
for them...
442 U.S. at 495. See, e.g., Walter F. Roche Jr., Young wins a key victory in bribery
trial, BALT. SUN Sept.23, 1999 at 2B (in bribery trial of state senator, prosecution
was precluded from introducing defendant's vote in legislative committee).
Certainly, this evidentiary rule makes any public corruption prosecution against a
legislator, based on historical evidence, extremely difficult. The rule, however,
does not preclude evidence of the legislative acts in a prosecution against the
defendant who paid the bribe.
42. See Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 490-91 (waiver of preclusion of evidence of
legislative acts must be explicit and unequivocal).
43. 28 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1994).
44. See id. at 294.
45. 445 U.S. 360 (1980).
46. See id. at 362.
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and charged with racketeering." The defendant claimed that the
government was precluded from introducing evidence of his
legislative acts." The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim
and held that the defendant could not avail himself of any
evidentiary preclusion. 9 Therefore, in a federal prosecution against
the senator described herein, the prosecution would not be
precluded from introducing evidence of the defendant's legislative
acts to show the corrupt intent of the campaign contributions and
real estate commissions.
IV. Tying the Honest Services Doctrine to Specified Unlawful
Activity
The refusal to accept election results, favorable job approval
ratings or the merit of the underlying conduct as preclusion to
prosecution does not necessarily insulate the prosecution from
political intimidation. Because the term "intangible right to honest
services" is not defined in the statute and is inherently vague, the
question of whether the conduct rises to a level of a criminal
offense under section 1346 is left to the discretion and vagaries of
the prosecutor. As a consequence, a prosecutor -is particularly
vulnerable to criticism that he has over-played his hand in
characterizing the conduct as rising to the level of a federal criminal
offence. In an attempt to undermine the credibility of the prosecu-
tion, the defendant and his supporters may attack and raise
questions about the motives of the individual prosecutor. In order
to fracture this intimidation and maintain the integrity of the
prosecution, prosecutors should distill the scope of a section 1346 to
a set of federal criminal offenses that require proof of intent to
influence or affect state action or the conduct of government to
further some private interest. By limiting the statute to federal
bribery, conflict of interest, illegal gratuity and extortion offenses,
unsavory behavior and sordid acts would be distinguished from
criminal conduct warranting a federal public corruption
investigation and prosecution."
47. See id.
48. See id. at 366.
49. See id. at 374.
50. Recently, Chief Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals recognized the peril arising from this ambiguity and wrote in United
States v. Martin, 195 F.3d 961, 965, 967 (7th Cir. 1999) that:
Concern has long been expressed that the failure of the mail fraud statute
to define "fraud" invests prosecutorial overreaching. The concern has
been exacerbated by Congress's restoration to the mail fraud statue of
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Section 1346 is not a precisely-targeted prohibition. It contains
no predicate or independent violation requirement. As a conse-
quence, the statute has the latent potential to apply to almost any
misconduct by a public official that can be viewed as a breach of
"public trust." The broad scope of the section 1346 should not,
however, include every instance of bad behavior and unethical
conduct. 1  The statute does have its boundaries. For example,
misconduct by a public official in a private matter or salacious
personal misconduct that does not implicate the conduct of
government should not be the subject of a federal public corruption
investigation with the hope that it will be eventually linked to state
action or the conduct of government. 2
The Sixth Circuit has attempted to limit the reach of the
statute by narrowing it to a public official's misuse of his office for
pecuniary gain. 3 This is too restrictive an application. A better
reasoned position is to tie the reach of the statute to conduct that is
intended to influence or affect state action or the conduct of
government to further a private interest. Thus, to give structure
and meaning to the right to fair and honest government,
prosecutors should narrow the scope of section 1346 to federal
bribery, conflict of interest, illegal gratuity and extortion offenses.
Each of these federal offenses requires the prosecution to show, to
varying degrees, an intent to influence or affect state action or the
conduct of government. By setting a clear standard, the statute
would not be deployed to probe allegations of trivial and technical
the "intangible rights" doctrine... It can be argued that tying the
concept of fraud in the mail fraud statute to state law and to federal
statutes expressly creating fiduciary duties would ally the persistent
concerns about the breadth and vagueness of the statute. The textual
arguments deployed in Sun Diamond Growers to cabin the gratuity
statute may point the way to a narrowing interpretation of the mail fraud
statute-or it may not, for it can be argued that the considerations
deployed in that opinion are not available in interpreting the mail fraud
statute, with its sparse text.
51. See United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 725 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[A]lthough
a public official might engage in reprehensible misconduct related to an official
position, the conviction of that official for honest-services fraud cannot stand
where the conduct does not actually deprive the public of its right to her honest
services...").
52. See United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290, 1295 (6th Cir. 1986) (section 1346
is not intended to be a remedy for personal misconduct); United States v. Espy,
989 F. Supp. 17, 26 (D.D.C. 1997) ("A public official's fraud on the public may
clearly fall within the meaning of honest services fraud where dishonest conduct by
the public official directly implicates the functions and duties of that official's
public office.")
53. See Gray, 790 F.2d at 1295.
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offenses. Federal investigations would thus be proportionate to the
conduct and far less likely to spin out of control.
A. Bribery.
Under the federal bribery statute,54 the prosecution must prove
two essential elements: first, that the public official solicited or
accepted something of value; second, that any payment was
intended to influence or affect a specific public action to further a
private interest." The solicitation or acceptance of a bribe or
kickback by a public official in exchange for an agreement to
influence or affect specific public action denies the public and
political process fair and honest government 6
54. Section 201(b) punishes anyone who "corruptly gives, offers or promises
anything of value to any public official ... with intent ... to influence any official
act." 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1).
In United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, (4th Cir. 1998), the court explained
that:
To prove bribery under § 201, the government is not required to prove an
expressed intention (or agreement) to engage in a quid pro quo. Such an
intent may be established by circumstantial evidence. Also, the
government need not show that the defendant intended for his payments
to be tied to specific official acts (or omissions). Bribery requires the
intent to effect an exchange of money (or gifts) for specific official action
(or inaction), but each payment need not be correlated with a specific
official act. Rather, it is sufficient to show that the payor intended for
each payment to induce the official to adopt a specific course of action...
Further, it is not necessary for the government to prove that the payor
intended to induce the official to perform a set number of official acts in
return for the payments. The quid pro quo requirement is satisfied so
long as the evidence shows a course of conduct of favors and gifts flowing
to a public official in exchange for a pattern of official actions favorable
to the donor. Thus, all that must be shown is that payments were made
with the intent of securing a specific type of official action or favor in
return.
Id. at 1014 (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis omitted).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Pankhurst, 118 F.3d 345, 352 (5th Cir. 1997)
(affirming bribery conviction of businessman who offered payment to Resolution
Trust official); United States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 1522 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(affirming bribery conviction of public housing officers); United States v. Tomblin,
46 F.3d 1369, 1381 (5th Cir. 1995) (affirming bribery conviction of businessman
who offered payment to administrative assistant to U.S. Senator).
56. Prosecutions under the intangible right to honest services fraud have
traditionally been grounded on bribery. See Paradise, 98 3d at 1283 n.30. In
upholding the conviction of the governor of Maryland, the Fourth Circuit
explained how bribery of a public official can constitute honest services fraud:
[Tihe fraud involved in the bribery of a public official lies in the fact that
the public official is not exercising his independent judgment in passing
on official matters... When a public official has been bribed, he
breaches his duty of honest, faithful and disinterested service ... [T]he
official has been paid for his decisions, perhaps without even considering
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B. Conflict of Interest
17Under the federal conflict of interest statute, it is a crime for a
public official to exercise influence or judgment in an official matter
while at the same time maintaining a private or pecuniary interest
in the matter." A public official who influences or affects state
action or the conduct of government with the intent of benefiting or
promoting a personal or private interest compromises his legal
commitment to provide the public with fair and honest
government. 9 The classic case of such a conflict is when a public
official uses his position to steer government business to a private
interest.' As a consequence, the intangible right to honest services
incorporates conflict of interest, and section 1346 can be used to
prosecute a public official who influences or affects state action or
the conduct of the government to benefit or promote a personal or
private interest.61
In United States v. Waymer,62 a member of the Atlanta Board
of Education was charged with mail fraud under section 1346. At
trial, the government presented evidence that the defendant failed
to disclose that he was being paid a commission from a private firm
the merits of the matter. Thus, the public is not receiving what it expects
and is entitled to, the public official's honest and faithful service.
United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1362 (4th Cir. 1979) vacated in part and
remanded to United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1988).
57. Section 208(a) prohibits a public official from participating in any official
act in which he has a private interest. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (2000).
58. See United States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 1998) citing
United States v. Silvano, 812 F.2d 754, 759 (1st Cir. 1987).
59. See Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 724.
60. See id.
61. The First Circuit recently explained that a conflict of interest has the
potential to constitute honest services fraud:
A public official has an affirmative duty to disclose material information
to the public employer. When an official fails to disclose a personal
interest in a matter over which she has decision-making power, the public
is deprived of its right either to disinterested decision making itself or, as
the case may be, to full disclosure as to the official's potential motivation
an official act. Thus, undisclosed, biased decision making for personal
gain, whether or not tangible loss to the public is shown, constitutes a
deprivation of honest services.
Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 724; see also McNally, 483 U.S. at 362, (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(in a typical prosecution under the honest services doctrine, a public official has
secretly made governmental decisions with the objective of benefiting themselves
or promoting their own interests instead of fulfilling their legal commitment to
provide the citizens of the state or local government with their loyal service and
honest government.).
62. 55 F.3d 564, 567 (11th Cir. 1995).
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that was awarded public contracts by the Board of Education.6 The
commission payments alone were not illegal.6' Rather, the govern-
ment contended that the failure to disclose the payments was a
conflict of interest and, thus, a crime under section 1346. The
defendant was convicted and he appealed.65
On appeal, the defendant contended that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain his mail fraud conviction.6' In affirming the
conviction, the Eleventh Circuit found that the defendant's failure
to disclose the existence of the pecuniary relationship constituted a
conflict of interest and that this conflict was a proper predicate for a
section 1346 violation. 6' The court explained:
[The defendant] contends that his general fiduciary duty to the
citizens of Atlanta did not require him to disclose that he was
receiving fifteen percent of the proceeds from... contracts with
the Atlanta school system and that he performed virtually no
services in exchange for theses payments. For a School Board
member to be receiving a direct and substantial cut from a
vendor's contract with the school system in exchange for the
performance of virtually no services so obviously smacks of
impropriety that it can hardly be characterized as a minor detail
of which the Board need not be apprised. The fact that [the]
companies could afford to pay [the defendant]-who did
nothing to help... procure or retain the school board contracts
-fifteen percent of the proceeds of the contracts strongly
suggests that there were at least fifteen percent of unnecessary
expenses in [the] bids for the contracts. Had the Board known
this, it likely would have re-bid the contracts at a considerable
savings to the citizens of Atlanta. Accordingly, we find no merit
in [the defendant's] contention that as a fiduciary to the citizens
of Atlanta, he had no duty to disclose the fact that he was
receiving fifteen percent of what the school board was paying
[the] companies ostensibly for pest control and other services.
63. See id. at 572.
64. See id. at 569-70.
65. See id. at 566-67.
66. See Waymar, 55 F.3d at 570-71.
67. See id. at 571-72.
68. Id. at 572; see also Paradise, 98 F.3d at 1266 (affirming federal mail fraud
conviction of Atlanta City Council member based on payments made in exchange
for his political influence to reduce rent at airport).
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C. Illegal Gratuity.
Similar to a bribe, other improper benefits and payments, such
as campaign contributions, gifts and other gratuities to a public
official intended to influence or affect state action or the conduct of
government, corrupts the decision-making process by injecting a
competing private interest. For this reason, section 1346 should
reach beyond quid pro quo bribery to include a less exacting and
more subtle pattern of payments.
Not all payments to a public official are corrupt. The
fundamental issue in evaluating conduct involving payments to a
public official is where is the boundary between money contributed
lawfully because of a candidate's positions on issues and money
contributed unlawfully because of corruption.6' There is a line
between money spent to develop access, relationships and business
opportunities and money spent as part of a scheme to defraud the
state and public of fair and honest government.7" The difference is
69. Cf United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405 (7th Cir. 1993):
Money fuels the American political machine. Campaigns are expensive,
and candidates most constantly solicit funds. People vote for candidates
and contribute to the candidates' campaigns because of those candidates'
views, performance, and promises. It would be naive to suppose that
contributors do not expect some benefit: support for favorable legislation,
for their contributions. To hold that a politician committed [a criminal
offense] merely by acting for some constituents' benefit shortly before or
after receiving campaign contributions from those constituents would
open to prosecution not only conduct that has long been thought to be
well within the law but also conduct that in a very real sense is
unavoidable so long as election campaigns are financed by private
contributions or expenditures, as they have been from the beginning of
the nation.
Id. at 410-11 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The reality was well described by Tom Wolf in his "A Man In Full," (1998):
Every letter in that stack proposed the same deal. Bind yourself to our
agenda, and you can keep the money. After a couple of months you're
beginning to pant for money. You're beginning to need it the way you
need food and air. These campaigns devour money, and by now the
vendors are all too smart to sell you anything on credit. You start
thinking back to all those checks you turned down in such a high-minded
way. You start wondering if you couldn't review your positions and find
room under your umbrella for some of these ... really not so terrible...
special-interest organizations and their... $20,000 checks... because
you have now learned an elemental lesson, which is: nobody-nobody wins
a citywide election strictly on the merits.
TOM WOLFE, A MAN IN FULL (1998),
70. See, e.g., Frank Bruni, Donors Flock to University Center linked to Senate
Majority Leader, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1999, at Al (describing substantial donations
to an academic center named for Senate majority leader from companies with
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whether payments are linked to a corrupt intent to influence or
affect state action or the conduct of government to further some
private interest.7 Even a pattern of legal campaign contributions
may be sufficient to demonstrate a corrupt intent if the payments
were intended to go beyond routine cultivation of a relationship or
support of a public official to influence or affect public action or the
conduct of government to further some private interest .
Therefore, a more narrow reading of the honest services fraud
proposed here should incorporate principles set out in the federal
illegal gratuity statute 73 to make it clear that section 1346 can be
applied to any payment or other action intended to influence or
affect a public action or the conduct of government to further some
private interest.
74
pending Congressional legislation). The reporter makes the following observation:
Observant students of government may well divine an additional lesson: that
money follows politicians to a surprising number of places, and that individuals
and corporations have legal ways above and beyond direct campaign
contributions- and legally mandated limits on those donations to make politicians
feel loved. Id.
71. See Allen, 10 F.3d at 410-11.
72. See Allen, 10 F.3d at 411 (holding that a campaign contribution does not
necessarily equal taking a bribe unless the payment is made in exchange for an
explicit promise to perform or not perform an official act).
73. The federal gratuity statute punishes anyone who "gives, offers, or
promises anything of value to any public official ... for or because of any official
act performed or to be performed by a public official." 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A)
(2000).
74. See Jennings, 160 F.3d at 1013-14 (distinguishing between a bribe and
illegal gratuity based on intent behind the payment:
Whether a payment is a bribe or an illegal gratuity under § 201 depends
on the intent of the payor. A bribe requires that the payment be made or
promised "corruptly," that is, with "corrupt intent." Under §201 "corrupt
intent" is the intent to receive a specific benefit in return for the
payment ... An illegal gratuity .... is a payment made to an official
concerning a specific official act (or omission) that the payor expected to
occur in any event. No corrupt intent to influence official behavior is
required.).
In United States v. Schaffer, 183 F.3d 833, 840-41 (D.C. Cir. 1999), The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia explained the link necessary to establish a
violation of the federal gratuity statute:
[A violation of the federal gratuity statute] requires the presence of three
separate elements: that the defendant (i) knowingly gave a thing of value;
(ii) to a public official or person selected to be a public official; (iii) for or
because of any official act performed or to be performed... But while
all involved agree that the gratuity statute's scienter reqLurement
demands more than a gift motivated by the recipient's official status ...
the magnitude of the necessary link its proper translation into a concrete
rule of decision, remains in some doubt... First a gratuity can take the
form of a reward for past action... Second, a gratuity can be intended to
entice a public official who has already staked out a position favorable to
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The ambiguity of the meaning of the intangible right to honest
services is rivaled by the blurry line that separates illegal payments
from permissible "gifts" to public officials. Recently, the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia clarified this line, by
defining the corrupt intent element of the offense. In United States
v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California," a large agricultural
cooperative was charged with making illegal gifts to Michael Espy
while he was Secretary of Agriculture. At trial, the government
presented evidence that the defendant gave Espy expensive gifts
and paid his travel and entertainment expenses to attend several
sporting events." The defendant was convicted under the federal
gratuity statute and he appealed.77
On appeal, the defendant challenged the jury instruction that
permitted the jury to convict if it found that the defendant gave
Espy things of value merely in recognition of his official position
regardless of an intent to influence or affect public action. In
response, the government argued that it was required to prove only
that the payments were motivated by the recipient's official
position without regard to an intent to influence or affect public
action.7 ' The Court agreed with the defendant and overturned the
conviction. The court held that the federal gratuity statute requires
proof that the payments were motivated not simply by the
recipient's position, but by an intent to influence or affect official
conduct.79 The court held that "to satisfy the criminal intent
requirement embodied in the phrase for or because of any official
act," the giver must intend either to reward some past concrete
official act or acts, or to enhance the likelihood of some future act
or acts.8 The court explained that to prove the corrupt intent under
the gratuity statute, the government must show some relationship
between the payment and official action:
the giver to maintain that position... Finally, a gratuity can be given
with the intent to induce a public official to propose, take, or shy away
from some future official act. This third category would additionally
encompass gifts given in the hope that, when the particular official
actions move to the forefront, the public official will listen hard to, and
hopefully be swayed by, the giver's proposals, suggestions, and/or
concerns.
75. 138 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir.) cert. granted 525 U.S. 961 (1998).
76. See id. at 964.
77. See id. at 964-65.
78. See id. at 966-68.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 966.
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We have refused to allow the official act requirement to be
satisfied by some vague hope of inducing warm feelings toward
the donor... the terms of the statute require a finding that the
gifts were motivated by more than merely the giver's desire to
ingratiate himself with the official generally, or to celebrate the
latter's status... But in contrast to bribery, it is enough under
the gratuity statute if the defendant gives an unpromised benefit
for a past government favor. And, whatever degree of intent to
influence may be necessary for a bribe, a gift looking to future
acts can be an unlawful gratuity where the giver is motivated
simply by the desire to increase the likelihood of one or more
81
specific, favorable acts.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed. The
Court held that in order to establish a violation of the federal
gratuity statute, the government must prove a demonstrated link
between the gift and a specific "official act."' In a unanimous
opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court rejected the govern-
ment's reading of the statute.83 The Court found that such an
interpretation would impermissibly criminalize token gifts to public
officials that are not linked to any identifiable official act, leaving
what constituted a violation to discretion of the government
prosecutors. 84 The Court added that because federal public
corruption statutes typically set forth "precisely targeted prohibi-
tions ... a statute in this field that can be linguistically be
interpreted to be either a meat axe or a scalpel should reasonably
be taken to be the latter.,
85
In the companion case to Sun Diamond, the District Court for
the District of Columbia reaffirmed the proposition that conflict of
interest and illegal gratuity statutes are proper predicates for an
honest services fraud prosecution.' In United States v. Espy, the
Independent Counsel alleged that Espy defrauded the United
States and its citizens of their intangible right to fair and honest
government by illegally soliciting and receiving gratuities from
individuals and business with matters pending before the
Department of AgricultureY In addition, the Independent Counsel
81. See Sun-Diamond, 138 F.3d at 966-68.
82. 526 U.S. 398, 414 (1999).
83. See id. at 408-12.
84. See id. at 406-08.
85. See id. at 412. See also Linda Greenhouse, High Court Voids Theory Used
to Press Cases Over Gifts to Espy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1999 at A26.
86. See United States v. Espy, 989 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1997).
87. See id. at 21-25.
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claimed that Espy submitted false public disclosure reports and lied
to investigators in an attempt to conceal the receipt of those
gratuities."
Prior to trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment
and argued that the indictment failed to allege that he engaged in
any official act in exchange for the gratuities." The district court
denied the motion and held that there were sufficient grounds to
sustain the charges. 90 The court explained:
The meaning of honest services has not received even
interpretation from the courts. Generally, honest services fraud
contemplates instances where the defendant in rendering
services was aware that his actions were less than in the best
interest of the employer. It also encompasses instances when a
public decision-maker fails to disclose a conflict of interest
resulting in personal gain. Although, not every dishonest or
disloyal act by an employee violates the wire fraud statute, a
breach of fiduciary duty to disclose material information to an
employer falls within the strictures of the statute. A public
official's fraud on the public may clearly fall within the meaning
of honest services fraud where dishonest conduct by the public
official directly implicates the functions and duties of that
official's public office. Moreover, public officials may be held to
a higher standard of public trust due to concerns that conflicts of
interest may harm the public merely by giving the illusion of
unfairness. Thus, undisclosed, biased decision making for
personal gain, whether or not tangible loss to the public is
shown, constitutes a deprivation of honest services.91
The district court then concluded that:
In this case, the allegations that the defendant solicited and
received illegal gratuities, intentionally violated a criminal
gratuities statute and later committed acts to conceal this illegal
activity are sufficient to support an indictable offense for honest
services. It is not disputed that the existence of an apparent
conflict of interest is sufficient to constitute a violation of a
government agent's fiduciary duty. It is also not contested that
88. See id. at 23-25.
89. See id. at 25.
90. See id.
91. See Espy, 989 F. Supp. at 25-26 (citations omitted).
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misrepresentation or intentional non-disclosure are inherently
dishonest acts. Therefore, since the defendant's alleged breach
of fiduciary duty includes elements of dishonesty, the indictment
sufficiently states an offense honest services fraud.92
The First Circuit has also drawn this line in two prosecutions
based on the payment of travel and entertainment expenses for
state legislator by a lobbyist. In United States v. Sawyer,93 the
defendant, a lobbyist for the largest life insurance company in
Massachusetts, was charged with mail fraud under section 1346.
The charge was based on a violation of the Massachusetts' illegal
gratuity statute.94 The government contented that the defendant
paid for the travel and entertainment expenses for several
legislators on the committee responsible for legislation affecting the
92. Id. at 27 (citations omitted). The Independent Counsel spent four years
investigating Espy, culminating in a seven-week trial in November and December
of 1998. Many of the executives who gave gifts to Espy testified that they saw
nothing wrong with such "gestures" and expected nothing in return. On
December 2, 1998, Espy was acquitted of all charges. See Neil A Lewis, Espy Is
Acquitted On Gifts Received While In Cabinet, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1998 at Al; Phil
Kuntz and Elizabeth Crowley, Espy Acquitted on All Counts in Criminal Trial,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1998, at A24:
Mr. Espy was accused of taking illegal gratuities valued at $33,228. These
took the form of tickets to sporting events; luggage; cash to his girlfriend
and a job for her; limousine rides; travel expenses and contributions to his
brother's unsuccessful congressional campaign. Prosecutors also charged
Mr. Espy with witness tampering and false statements to cover up his
alleged crimes, as well as wire and mail fraud. The case began after an
article in The Wall Street Journal in March 1994 raised questions about
some of the gifts, Mr. Espy was later forced to resign from the Clinton
administration.
Prosecutors faced an uphill fight because they had no evidence
directly linking any of the gifts to a specific official act by Mr. Espy. All
the benefits came from companies with major stakes in the Agriculture
Department policy... And the timing of many of the gifts suggested that
the companies were trying to curry favor with Mr. Espy while he was
weighing major decisions in which they had a stake.
Mr. Espy's lawyers argued that their client accepted the gifts because
he thought they were being offered by friends and were lawful. They
admitted that their client had made mistakes in failing to disclose many of
the gifts on financial-disclosure forms, but not because he was trying to
hide them.
93. 85 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 1996).
94. See id. at 722.
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life insurance industry in violation of the state's gift-statute. 9
Unlike the federal gratuity statute, to prove a violation of the Mass-
achusetts gift-statute the government was not required to show that
the gratuities were paid to influence or affect a public action.96
The defendant was convicted and he appealed. 97 On appeal,
the defendant complained that the evidence failed to establish that
he engaged in a scheme to deny the citizens of their right to honest
services.98 The First Circuit refused to endorse a lower standard
and reversed the conviction. 99 The court held that because the
state's gift-statute does not require proof that the gratuities were
paid to influence or affect state action, an intent to defraud the
public of fair and honest government could not be found solely
based on a violation of this state law.1°° The court explained that:
A violation of the Massachusetts gift statute does not necessarily
entail any improper motive to influence, or otherwise affect, the
official duties of the recipient. It is possible for lobbyist to give
a legislator items falling within the statute's definition of "gift,"
or for a legislator to accept such gifts, without an accompanying
intent to cause the legislator to deviate from the honest
performance of official duties. While such gifts would constitute
a gift-statute violation, not every such circumstance would
necessarily amount to a deviation from the official's perform-
ance of honest services to the public. Thus, unlike the honest
services fraud cases... in which an official was bribed or took
official action based on a secret conflict of interest, a gift statute
violation, even if intentional, does not in itself amount to honest
services fraud. While the Massachusetts' citizenry expects their
legislators to comply with laws pertaining to their official
capacity, the presence of such illegal conduct, even though it
relates to public office, does not by itself... establish honest
services fraud. To allow every transgression of state govern-
mental obligations to amount to mail fraud would effectively
turn every such violation into a federal felony; this cannot be
countenanced. Because the court's instructions allowed the jury
to equate a gift statute violation with the deprivation of honest
services, it also permitted the jury to find an "intent to defraud"
from the intent to violate the statute, without more. To
establish the scheme to defraud through these violations,
95. See id. at 725-27.
96. See id. at 727.
97. See id. at 719.
9& See Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 723.
99. See id. at 723.
100. See id. at 728-29.
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however, it must also have charged and shown that the intent
behind the violations was the deprivation of honest services. 1°1
In the companion case against the public official, the court
sustained the conviction of the state legislator and found that the
payments from the lobbyist in Sawyer were intended to gain
"preferentially interests" and "ongoing favorable official action"
in derogation of the public's right to impartial services.
In United States v. Woodward, 2 the government presented
evidence that the defendant, the former chairman of the Joint
Committee on Insurance in the Massachusetts state legislature, had
received payments for entertainment expenses from the insurance
industry over a period of six years. The government showed that
from 1985 through 1991, the defendant was the co-chair of the
Insurance Committee."' As co-chair, the defendant had the
authority to affect the disposition of laws that impacted on the
insurance industry. During this time, the defendant accepted in
excess of $9,000 in gratuities from the insurance industry.'4 These
expenses included at least $8,740 in meals, rounds of golf and other
entertainment."' The pattern formed by the expenditures was as
follows: in 1984 and 1985, before the defendant became chair of the
Committee and for the first year afterward, the defendant accepted
gratuities in the range of $200-300 from the insurance industry."°6 In
1986 there was a marked increase to $2,527, including over $1,800
to cover the airfare, hotel, and tickets to attend the Super Bowl in
New Orleans." From 1987 to 1991, the defendant received six
payments gratuities in the total amount of $4,708."8 The defendant
served as committee chair during all but the last of those years."
During the last four months in the legislature, January through
April 1992, he received only $16 and his gratuities dropped to $0
after he resigned from office in April.10
The defendant was convicted and he appealed. On appeal, he
argued that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that
he had the requisite corrupt intent. The court rejected this
101. See id. (citations omitted).
102. 149 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 1998).
103. See id. at 51.
104. See id.
105. See id.
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contention and affirmed the conviction. The court found that the
evidence established an intent to be influenced and that the
defendant had accepted gratuities with the intent to deprive the
public of his honest services by performing official acts that were
favorable to the insurance industry."1 This conclusion was based on
several points. First, that the insurance industry had a long-term
ongoing interest in the defendant's official acts and the defendant
took official action favorable to the insurance industry. Second,
that the defendant had accepted items of substantial value. Third,
that the gratuities ceased after the defendant left the legislature.
Fourth, that the defendant knew that gratuities were illegal. Fifth,
that the defendant attempted to cover-up the payments. Finally,
after the defendant left the state legislature, he made several
statements indicating that he expected some kind of reward from
the insurance industry for his favoring the industry's position in the
legislature."2
The court rejected the defendant's contention that the
gratuities were solely based on friendship. The court found that the
relationship was not consistent with mere friendship as the sole
purpose of the payments, but rather was more consistent with the
theory of a gratuity paid because of the defendant's potential
official actions. The court noted that the relationship began after
the defendant became a member of the Insurance Committee and
that the gifts increased substantially shortly after the defendant
became chair of the committee that handled insurance legislation.
In addition, the court found that the expenditures were not mutual,
but rather operated in one direction only and that the defendant
111. See Woodward, 149 F.3d at 53.
112. See id. Intent was also inferred from the defendant's actions on bills that
were favorable to the insurance industry. Although the court held that it was not
necessary for the government to link a particular gratuity with a specific act in
order to obtain a conviction, the court also found that the evidence showed that
the defendant, in his official capacity as chair of the Insurance Committee, took
action that served the interest of his benefactors. Testimony at trial indicted that
the defendant was the most pro-life insurance-industry chair on the Committee,
that he took pro-industry positions in opposition to his own committee, led the
Insurance Committee to support and report favorably bills proposed by the
industry, carried bills sought by the insurance industry and pushed bills thought the
legislative process-actively guided bills thought he legislative process. Of the 600
bills that were of interest to the insurance industry the defendant opposed only
thirty-one of those bills. Based upon the nature and sequences of events, the court
held that an inference regarding the defendant's corrupt intent could be drawn
from the evidence. The court then concluded that a reasonable juror could find
that the gratuities were linked to official action that was favorable to the insurance
industry and that the defendant intended to be influence by the gratuities. Id.
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accepted gratuities in a non-mutual and non-reciprocal way."3
Therefore, the court found that the defendant's acceptance of
expenditures in the context of their business relationship con-




The federal extortion statute is used to address public
corruption by making it a crime for a public official to obtain or
induce payment "under color of official right. 11 5  Extortion is
committed "under color of official right" by "fear and intimidation"
or "office.",1 6 Extortion by fear and intimidation is when a public
113. "The expenditures and the acceptance can be reasonable viewed as not
being based on the two men's friendship but rather based on a business
-relationship." See id.
114. See id. at 58-59.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2000) makes it a federal criminal offense to obstructs,
delay or affect commerce by extortion. Section 1951(a)(3) defines extortion to
include obtaining property from another "induced by wrongful use of actual or
threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right."; See, e.g.,
United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1274 (4th Cir. 1986) (public official may be
convicted of extortion under federal statute for obtaining property either through
fear or under "color of official right.").
116. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992) (acceptance of bribe
establishes all the inducement required by federal extortion statute if intent of
payment is to influence or affect specific action). Evidence of the legislative acts
are particularly relevant in connection with assertions that charge the legislator
extorted campaign contributions. Evidence of campaign contributions, standing
alone, in a public corruption prosecution charging extortion present unique
evidentiary problems. Legal campaign contributions may simply be a cover or the
vehicle for a bribe. Nevertheless, criminal inducement of a legislator cannot be
inferred simply from his acceptance of campaign contributions. The contributions
must be linked to conduct affecting or influencing a specific government action. In
McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 272-73 (1991), the Court found that:
Serving constituents and supporting legislation that will benefit the
district and individuals and groups therein is the everyday business of a
legislator. It is also true that campaigns must be run and financed. Money
is constantly being solicited on behalf of candidates, who run on
platforms and who claim support on the basis of their views and what
they intend to do or have done. Whatever ethical considerations and
appearances may indicate, to hold that legislators commit the federal
crime of extortion when they act for the benefit of constituents or support
legislation furthering the interests of some of their constituents, shortly
before or after campaign contributions are solicited and received from
those beneficiaries, is an unrealistic assessment of what Congress could
have meant by making it a crime to obtain property [by extortion] ... To
hold otherwise would open to prosecution not only conduct that has long
been thought to be well within the law but also conduct that in a very real
sense is unavoidable so long as election campaigns are financed by
private contributions or expenditures ... This is not to say that it is
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official obtains or induces payment by using his control over state
action or the conduct of government."7 For example, extortion
would be present if a public official were to inform a corporation
that it would never be awarded a state contract unless campaign
contributions were made."8  Extortion by "office" resembles
bribery, and occurs when the public official obtains or induces
payment in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the
official to influence or affect state action or the conduct of
government." 9  Honest services fraud includes any payment
impossible for elected officials to commit extortion in the course of
financing an election campaign. Political contributions are of course
vulnerable if induced by the use of force, violence or fear. The receipt of
such contributions is also vulnerable under the [federal extortion statute]
as having been taken under color of official right, but only if the
payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by
the official to perform or not to perform an official act. In such situations
the official asserts that official conduct will be controlled by the terms of
the promise or undertaking. This is the receipt of money by an elected
official [by extortion].
117. See Evans, 504 U.S. at 274-75 (J., Kennedy concurring)
("[F]or a public official to commit extortion under color of official right, his course
of dealings must establish a real understanding that failure to make a payment will
result in the victimization of the prospective payor or the withholding of more
favorable treatment, a victimization or withholding accomplished by taking or
refraining from taking official action.").
See also United States v. McDonough, 56 F.3d 381, 388 (2nd Cir. 1995) ("In
order for a jury to find a defendant guilty of extortion under color of official right,
the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victims were
motivated to make payments as a result of the defendant's control or influence
over public officials and that the defendant was aware of this motivation."); see,
e.g., Kevin Sack, Former Louisiana Governor Is Indicted in Extortion Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 1998 at A7 (describing prosecution based on demand by former
governor for payments from companies biding for casino licenses).
118. See, e.g., Matt O'Connor and Gary Wasburn, Santos Done In By Tape,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 4, 1999 (describing conviction of city treasurer on federal
extortion charges stemming from her attempted extortion of campaign
contributions from companies doing business with her office during defendant's
campaign for attorney general).
119. See McCormick, 500 U.S. at 273. In McCormick a state legislator received
cash payments during his reelection campaign from lobbyist supporting a
particular piece of legislation. He subsequently sponsored and spoke in favor of
the legislation. The legislator was subsequently indicted and convicted of
extortion. But the Supreme Court reversed his conviction because the trial court
failed to instruct the jury that the receipt of campaign contributions constituted
extortion under color of official right "only if the payments are made in return for
an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not perform an
official act." Id. In connection with that opinion, the Court recognized several
realities of the political process:
Serving constituents and supporting legislation that will benefit the
district and individuals and groups therein is the everyday business of a
legislator. It is also true that campaigns must be run and financed. Money
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obtained or induced by a public official under color of title.
In United States v. Holzer,12° the defendant was charged with
mail fraud and extortion. At trial, the government presented
evidence showing that, during the time the defendant was a state
court judge, he repeatedly solicited lawyers who appeared before
him for personal loans. The defendant was convicted and he
appealed.
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain the convictions. The Seventh Circuit
disagreed and affirmed the convictions. The court first affirmed the
mail fraud conviction and held that by deliberately concealing
material information from the public he violated his fiduciary duty
toward them. The court rejected any characterization of the
payments as loans:
It is doubtful that these transactions should be called "loans."
Out of some $200,000 in documented receipts from these
sources, [the defendant] repaid almost nothing; and the
evidence supports an inference that he never intended to repay
the money in full, realizing that the lawyers and guarantors of
the loans would never press him for repayment, because they
would fear retribution-with reason... Most of the loans,
indeed, seem to have been thinly disguised bribes.
121
is constantly being solicited on behalf of candidates, who run on
platforms and who claim support on the basis of their views and what
they intend to do or have done. Whatever ethical considerations and
appearances may indicate, to hold that legislators commit the federal
crime of extortion when they act for the benefit of constituents or support
legislation furthering the interests of some of their constituents, shortly
before or after campaign contributions are received from those
beneficiaries, is an unrealistic assessment of what Congress could have
meant by making it a crime to obtain property from another, with his
consent, "under color of official right." To hold otherwise would open to
prosecution not only conduct that has long been thought to be well within
the law but also conduct that in a very real sense is unavoidable so long as
election campaigns are financed by private contributions or expenditures,
as they have been from the beginning of the Nation.
This is not to say that it is impossible for an elected official to commit
extortion in the course of financing an election campaign. Political
contributions are of course vulnerable if induced by the use of force,
violence or fear. The receipt of such contributions is also vulnerable
under the Act as having been taken under color of official right, but only
if the payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking
by the official to perform or not perform an official act.
120. 816 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1987), vacated 484 U.S. 807 (1987).
121. Id. at 308.
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The court then found that it was reasonable to infer from the
character of the transactions that the payments were improper:
The character of the "loans" has twofold significance. First, it
shows that these were not arms-length transactions... Neither
party to an arms-length transaction is expected to show
gratitude, or to feel a sense of residual obligation, to the
other... It is when the other party to the transaction is doing
him a favor that an inference of gratuity, or an inference that a
quid pro quo can be expected, may arise and make the failure to
disclose the transaction to counsel for the opposing litigant
material.
Second, the systematic and long-continued receipt of bribes by a
public official, coupled with active efforts to conceal the
bribe-taking from the public and the authorities.., is fraud ....
It is irrelevant that, so far as appears, [the defendant] never
ruled differently in a case because of a lawyer's willingness or
unwillingness to make him a loan, so that his conduct caused no
demonstrable loss either to a litigant or to the public at large. 122
The court then affirmed the extortion conviction. The court
explained that:
[To establish a federal extortion offense] the payment must be
induced either by fear of what the payee might do if payment
were not forthcoming, or by the defendant's office... The two
types of inducement (fear and office) should be distinguished.
The first is based on fear of retribution by the official, wielding
his official powers; the second is based on a hope of benefit from
the exercise of those powers. The first covers cases of actual or
implied threat to use (or not to use) official powers to harm a
person if he doesn't pay the official, and corresponds to the lay
sense of "extortion"; the latter covers cases where bribes are
offered and accepted even without having been solicited. Both
types of "extortion" were charged in this case, and proved.
When a judge urgently and insistently 'asks a lawyer in a case
before him for a loan, the request connotes an implied threat...
to rule against the lawyer if he turns the judge down.
1 2 3
122. Id.
123. Id. at 310-11. See also United States v. McDonough, 56 F.3d 381 (2nd Cir.
1995). In McDonough, the defendant, the chairman of the county Democratic
committee, was convicted of extortion under section 1951 based on evidence that
he obtained kickbacks on municipal insurance contracts as a result of his ability to
control or influence public officials. The government showed that the payments




Typically, a charging decision in a public corruption case is a
retrospective task. The prosecutor looks back on the conduct of a
public official for evidence indicating a corrupt relationship or link
between a payment and intent to affect or influence state action or
the conduct of government to further some private interest. In
applying the honest services component of the federal mail and
wire fraud statutes, the prosecutor should view the conduct through
the prism of federal bribery, conflict of interest, illegal gratuity and
extortion offenses. By limiting the statute to these specified
unlawful offenses, bad behavior and unethical acts would be
distinguished from criminal conduct warranting federal public
corruption prosecution. The result would marginalize attempts to
undermine the credibility of the prosecution by raising questions
about the motives of the prosecutor.
Although favorable public opinion polls and reelection may
express a popular sentiment in conflict with an indictment and
prosecution, these political statements should not preclude the
application of the law. In addition, any merit resulting from the
public action is collateral. A subsequent prosecution will appear to
some to be astonishingly principled, while to others it will appear to
be stunningly ill-advised. Nevertheless, beyond appearances, the
prosecution will reflect a core commitment that every decision to
investigate and prosecute be consistent with an honest judgment of
the law and quality of the evidence.
were made because of the defendant's position to exert influence on public
officials. Second, the defendant did not perform any services in exchange for the
payments. Third, the defendant attempted to cover up the payments. See id. at
388-90.
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